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Abstract
In a model featuring sudden stops and pecuniary externalities, I show that the ability to
use capital controls has radical implications for the conduct of monetary policy. Absent
capital controls, following an inflation targeting regime is nearly optimal. However, if
the central bank lacks commitment, it will follow a monetary policy that is excessively
procyclical and not desirable from an ex ante welfare prospective: it increases overall
indebtedness as well as the frequency of financial crisis and reduces social welfare relative
to an inflation targeting regime. Access to capital controls can correct this monetary
policy bias. With capital controls, relative to an inflation targeting regime, the time-
consistent regime reduces both the frequency and magnitude of crises, and increases social
welfare. This paper rationalizes the procyclicality of the monetary policy observed in many
emerging market economies.
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1 Introduction
In the aftermath of a series of financial crises in emerging market countries, also known as
sudden stops (Calvo, 1998), there has been sharp debate over the optimal policies for preventing
recurrent credit crunches that emphasize the need to adopt an inflation targeting regime as
the main monetary framework, and the resort to capital flow management policies. In their
recent work, Vegh and Vuletin (2012) documented that, unlike developed economies where
the monetary policy is countercyclical, many emerging markets economies have procyclical
monetary policies. This empirical finding is somewhat puzzling and raises questions about
what is the optimal monetary policy. Can a procyclical monetary policy be optimal? How does
the availability of macroprudential policy tools change the optimal monetary policy framework?
What are the costs and benefits of adopting inflation targeting in sudden stop-prone economies?
I tackle the issue of the design of optimal monetary policy in emerging market economies
using a small open economy model featuring endogenous sudden stops and nominal rigidities.
The model builds on the real framework of Mendoza (2002), Bianchi (2011), Korinek (2011),
which features domestic agents borrowing from foreign investors subject to a credit constraint
that limits borrowing to a fraction of the market value of output. The novel features introduced
in this framework to study monetary policy are nominal price rigidities in the non-tradable
production sector and flexible exchange rate.
This article presents a normative framework that rationalizes the behavior of the monetary
authority in a sudden stop-prone economy, as an optimal time-consistent policy based on the
interplay between distortions arising from nominal rigidities and credit frictions. Then, I develop
a theoretical explanation of how the optimal uses of capital flow taxes can change the design
of the optimal time-consistent policy. Finally, in a calibrated version of the model, I compare
the effectiveness of an optimal time-consistent monetary policy to that of a simple inflation
targeting rule for reducing the incidence and severity of crises and increasing social welfare.
Two key features of the environment are aggregate demand externality and pecuniary exter-
nality. Aggregate demand externality emerges from the ’costly’ adjustment of nominal prices
and the change in the demand for labor that accompanies the increase in the demands for goods
on the part of individual households. Because households fail to internalize this externality, they
tend to over-consume, and thus to supply too much labor when the economy is undergoing a
boom. Furthermore, with credit constraints depending on market prices, a financial accelerator
mechanism is occasionally set in motion: when the constraint binds, demand for tradables falls,
the real wage and real exchange rates drop, tightening the credit constraint further. Households
also fail to internalize this pecuniary externality. Hence, the model embodies market failures
that a government that internalizes these externalities can improve upon.
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I start by studying the optimal monetary policy problem of a government that cannot com-
mit to future policies in an economy into which capital flows freely. The optimal time-consistent
monetary policy is solved as a Markov perfect equilibrium, and its formulation can easily be
related to the standard monetary policy rules developed in the New Keynesian literature (see,
e.g., Woodford, 2003; Farhi and Werning, 2016).
The optimal time-consistent monetary policy derived in this model expresses the path of
the inflation rate as a linear function of a measure of the output gap (i.e., the labor wedge) and
variables that account for the relevant financial conditions before and during periods when credit
constraints bind. This characterization highlights the role of financial frictions in the design
of monetary policy and suggests that monetary policy should react to financial conditions. In
the absence of credit frictions, a price stability policy is always optimal. This finding is in line
with the standard result in the New Keynesian literature suggesting that a policy that offsets
distortion stemming from nominal rigidities will be welfare-dominant when nominal rigidities
and monopolistic competition are the only causes of friction (see, e.g., Kollmann, 2002 and
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2007). Credit frictions, however, create policy trade-offs between
price stability and financial stability. Indeed, under flexible price allocation, when the credit
constraint is not binding households tend to overborrow due to the pecuniary externality, while
when it is binding they tend to over-consume goods due to the aggregate demand externality.
Hence, with credit frictions, a price stability policy is only optimal in the knife-edge case where
the intra- and intertemporal elasticities of substitution are equal.
The manner in which financial conditions influence monetary policy crucially depends on
the values of the intra- and intertemporal elasticities of substitution. In the empirically plau-
sible case in which the intratemporal elasticity is greater than the intertemporal elasticity and
the former is less than 1, optimal monetary policy involves a form of pro-cyclicality, being ex-
pansionary ahead of a potential financial crisis and contractionary when a crisis occurs. On the
one hand, ahead of a potential crisis, when borrowing is high but the credit constraint does not
bind, generating a boom in the non tradable sector discourages foreign borrowing when goods
are substitutes, and thus mitigates the overborrowing problem arising from pecuniary exter-
nalities. On the other hand, during a crisis, when the credit constraint binds, a contractionary
monetary policy reducing activity in the non-tradable sector serves two purposes: it sustains
the value of collateral and it tames the overheating induced by the excessive labor supply of
private agents. This characterization helps account for the observation of Vegh and Vuletin
(2012) that monetary policy appears to be procyclical in many emerging economies.
This paper also contributes to the literature on macroprudential policies in financially fragile
economies. Naturally, the availability of capital flow taxes modifies the features of the optimal
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monetary policy. When capital flow taxes are used optimally, the conditions under which a
price stability policy is desirable are less restrictive than when they cannot be used. Ahead
of potential crises, capital inflow taxes are effective in correcting the pecuniary externality,
and thus stabilizing prices is optimal. A policy trade-off between price stability and correcting
the externalities only arises during periods when the credit constraint is binding since capital
controls are then of little help.
The calibrated version of the model delivers important messages that contribute to the
current debate on the dilemma between monetary policy and capital controls. First, in the
absence of capital controls, relative to a simple targeting rule that stabilizes the producer
price index, hereafter an inflation targeting regime, the gains from adopting a procyclical time-
consistent regime are too small. The unconditional probability of crises is higher under the
time-consistent regime (12.7 percent versus 5.5 percent under an inflation targeting regime),
but crises, when they erupt, are less severe: for instance, total output drops by 21.9 percent
(versus 29.7 percent under an inflation targeting regime). Overall, a time-consistent regime is
welfare-dominated by an inflation-targeting regime.
The second message is that capital controls are always useful under both an inflation target-
ing regime and a time-consistent regime. This is because capital controls prevent excessive risk
exposure (see Bianchi, 2011; Jeanne and Korinek, 2012; Bianchi and Mendoza, forthcoming),
which reduces the volatility of the external accounts. Finally, the gains associated with the
time-consistent monetary policy are more important when capital controls are used optimally.
When the government has access to capital controls, a time-consistent regime is more effective
for increasing the social welfare, and for reducing both the incidence of crises (1.1 percent versus
1.3 percent under an inflation targeting regime with capital controls) and the severity of crises
(total output drops by 17.2 percent versus 17.8 percent under an inflation targeting regime with
capital controls).
This paper is related to the literature on the design of monetary policy in economies with
financial frictions.1 Christiano et al. (2004), Curdia (2007) Gertler et al. (2007) and Braggion
et al. (2009) study monetary policy in times of crisis in frameworks where financial markets are
incomplete and crises are unexpected one-shot events. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003),
Aghion et al. (2004) and Benigno et al. (2011) examined the design of monetary policy in an
environment where economies that last two or three periods and in which the credit constraint
becomes binding unexpectedly and remains binding afterwards. My analysis differs from these
studies in that it allows for crises to alternate with normal times. The dynamics of debt
1An earlier literature compared the performance of different monetary regimes in an environment with
financial market imperfections (see, e.g., Clarida et al., 2002; Céspedes et al., 2004 and Moron and Winkelried,
2005).
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accumulation is also important for the design of monetary policy.
More recent studies have explored monetary policy in dynamic environments featuring both
nominal rigidities and financial frictions. In particular, Fornaro (2015) compares the per-
formance of different monetary regimes and shows that a monetary regime that responds to
financial conditions in times of crisis delivers higher welfare than an inflation targeting regime.
Ottonello (2015) studies exchange rate policy with optimal capital flow taxes in an economy
featuring downward nominal wage rigidity and a collateral constraint. As in my model, in his
work the optimal exchange-rate policy fully eliminates the inefficiency stemming from nominal
rigidities when the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is greater than one. However, un-
like in the present paper, his finding relies on the asymmetry of nominal frictions (downward
rigidity). In addition, nominal rigidities in this framework introduce forward-looking effects,
which are central to time-inconsistency aspects of the optimal policy. I also discuss analytically
how the availability of capital controls can change importantly the properties of the optimal
time-consistent monetary policy.
In the same vein, using a model with an asymmetric nominal price adjustment and a col-
lateral constraint based on the expected future (resale) value of assets, Devereux et al. (2015)
study the optimal conduct of monetary policy and capital controls during a sudden stop. In
their paper, capital controls are only used under sudden stops to address the inefficiencies
of international capital market. As a consequence, without commitment capital controls are
not optimal from an ex-ante social welfare perspective. In contrast, I argue that when cap-
ital controls are used to prevent excessive risk exposure and stabilize the external accounts
(as in Bianchi (2011)), they become a useful tool that complements monetary policy under
both targeting rules and discretion. This paper also complements this literature by providing
a framework that explains the differences in the behavior of monetary authorities when the
economy is vulnerable to a financial crisis. This is important for a better assessment of the
potential benefits and welfare implications from other regulatory measures.
This paper also builds on the quantitative macro-finance literature studying pecuniary ex-
ternalities and inefficiency resulting from endogenous borrowing constraints (see, e.g., Loren-
zoni, 2008). Bianchi (2011), Korinek (2011) and Bengui and Bianchi (2014) studied how this
externality leads to overborrowing and showed to what extent capital control can restore con-
strained efficiency and reduce vulnerability to financial crises. Focusing on asset prices as a
key factor driving debt dynamics and pecuniary externalities, Bianchi and Mendoza (forthcom-
ing) point out the time-inconsistency issues in macroprudential policies originating from the
forward-looking nature of asset prices. This paper also can be related to the work of Acharya
and Bengui (2015), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016) and Farhi and Werning (2016), examining
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the use of taxes on financial transactions as a tool for managing aggregate demand in the pres-
ence of nominal rigidities and constraints on monetary policy. My paper draws upon to both
strands of the literature and stands out by analyzing how monetary policy should be designed
to simultaneously address both aggregate demand externalities and pecuniary externalities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the analytical
framework. Section 3 presents the optimal policy analysis. Section 4 conducts the quantitative
analysis. Section 5 concludes, and is followed by an extended appendix.
2 Model
Consider a dynamic model of a small open economy. Households in this economy consume two
goods (a tradable good and a nontradable good) and can also engage in borrowing with foreign
investors. The tradable good can be exchange with the rest of the world and the nontradable
good is consumed by domestic agents only. The government (or central bank) in this economy
sets the path of the nominal exchange rate as its monetary policy instrument.
2.1 Households






where β ∈ (0, 1) is a subjective discount factor, `t is labor supply and ct denotes consump-
tion. The period utility function takes the standard constant relative-risk-aversion form, with a
relative-risk-aversion coefficient σ. The consumption good is a composite of tradable consump-
tion cTt and nontradable consumption c
N




−η + (1− a)(cNt )−η
]− 1
η , η > −1, a ∈ (0, 1) (2)
The intratemporal elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods is γ =
1/(η + 1). Households receive a stochastic endowment of tradable goods yTt , profits Φt from
the ownership of firms producing the nontradable good, and labor income in each period t.
Households can trade internationally with foreign investors in one period state non-contingent
foreign bonds denominated in units of the foreign currency. The foreign bond pays a stochastic
interest rate Rt, determined exogenously in the world market. The tradable endowment and the
gross interest rate are the only sources of uncertainty, and the vector of shocks st ≡ (yTt , Rt) ⊆
R2+ is assumed to follow a first-order Markov process. The sequential budget constraint of the
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= P Tt y
T
t +Wt`t + Φt + Etbt (3)
where bt+1 denotes bond holdings that households choose at the beginning of time t. Et is the
nominal exchange rate defined as the price of the foreign currency in terms of the domestic
currency. In terms of the domestic currency, P Tt is the nominal price of the tradable good, P
N
t
the nominal price of the nontradable good and Wt the nominal wage rate. The law of one price
holds for the tradable good, which implies that P Tt = EtP T∗t where P T∗ denotes the foreign
currency price of the tradable good. To simply the analysis, the foreign-currency price of the
tradable good is assumed to be constant and normalized to one. It follows that the domestic
currency price of the tradable good is equal to the nominal exchange rate (i.e. P Tt = Et).
Households’ borrowing capacity is limited by a fraction κ of total income composed of







t +Wt`t + Φt
]
(4)
This type of borrowing constraint is common in the literature (e.g. Mendoza, 2002; Bianchi
(2011) and Benigno et al., 2013). The standard motivation for this credit constraint is that
it can result from institutional features of credit markets or financial-market frictions (such as
monitoring costs, bankruptcy risk or imperfections in the judicial system) and captures the
willingness of foreign lenders in such an environment to not allow borrowing beyond a certain
limit tied to the borrower’s income.2
The household’s problem is to choose stochastic processes {cTt , cNt , bt+1} to maximize the
expected utility (1) subject to (2)-(4), taking as given the sequence of prices, profits, exchange
rates, stochastic tradable endowments and interest rates, as well as the initial debt level b0.
Letting λt/P
T
t denotes the multiplier associated with the budget constraint (3) and µt/P
T
t the
multiplier associated with the credit constraint (4), the household’s first-order conditions are:






















2As shown by Bianchi and Mendoza (forthcoming), the credit constraint depends on current prices (rather
than future prices) when the possibility of default arises at the end of the current period.
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λt = βRtEtλt+1 + µt (8)




yTt + wt`t + φt
)]
= 0 (9)
where pNt ≡ PNt /Et denotes the relative price of nontradables in terms of tradables. Similarly,
wt ≡ Wt/Et represents the wage in terms of tradables and φt ≡ Φt/Et is the firm profits in terms
of tradables. The optimality condition (6) equates the marginal rate of substitution between the
two goods, the tradable and the nontradable, to their relative price. This condition describes
the demand for the nontradable good as a function of their relative price and the level of







cTt ≡ α(pNt )cTt .
The optimality condition for labor supply (7) equates marginal cost in terms of nontradable
consumption from working one additional unit with the marginal benefit, which includes the
relative wage wt/p
N
t and the relaxation effect on the credit constraint. The variable zt indicates
the wage multiplier of an increase in labor supply. In particular, when the credit constraint
binds, an increase of one unit of labor relaxes the constraint by κµt·wt, and the wage multiplier
of this increase in labor is greater than 1 (zt > 1). The Euler equation for debt (8) states that
the current shadow value of wealth equals the expected value of reallocating wealth to the next
period plus an additional term that represents the shadow price of relaxing the credit constraint.
Thus, conditions (7) and (8) show that the credit constraint introduces two distortions: an
intertemporal distortion arising from the presence of a credit constraint and an intratemporal
distortion that hinges on the wage income entering the credit constraint.
2.2 Nontradable Sector
Nontradable goods are supplied by firms and following standard practice in the New-Keynesian
literature, I introduce nominal rigidities in the nontradable goods market by separating the
sector into monopolistically competitive intermediate producers and perfectly competitive re-
tailers. The nontradable final good is produced by competitive firms that combine a continuum










where ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. Each variety yNj,t is
produced by a monopolistically competitive producer using labor hj,t according to a linear
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production function yNj,t = Ahj,t. These producers hire labor in a competitive market with wage
Wt, but pays (1− τh)Wt net of a labor subsidy. Cost minimization implies that each firm faces






Price setting The intermediate goods firms face sticky price setting à la Rotemberg (1982).
Accordingly, each firm j faces a cost of adjusting prices which, when measured in terms of the









where ϕ is an adjustment cost parameter which determines the degree of nominal price rigidity
and PNj,t is the nominal price of variety j. Taking as given the sequence for mct, y
N
t and Et, the
monopolistically competitive firm j optimally chooses the sequence of prices of its own variety,



















where Λi,t+i ≡ βtuN(t+i)/uN(i) is the household’s stochastic discount factor for the nontradable
good between date t and date t + i. Tt represents the lump sum tax that firms pay to the
government at date t. Each period, the intermediate goods firm faces a demand curve for its







In a symmetric equilibrium, all firms choose the same price (PNj,t = P
N
t for all j), and firms’
optimal pricing rule is described by the following condition:



















where 1 + πNt ≡ PNt /PNt−1 is the inflation rate of the nontradable good. Condition (10) is
the Rotemberg version of the non-linear New-Keynesian Phillips curve that relates the current
inflation to the current deviation of marginal cost from marginal revenue and to the expected fu-
ture inflation. It states that, given marginal costs, firms expecting higher inflation in the future
would already raise prices in the current period to smooth out the necessary price adjustments
over the time. According to this condition, firms would optimally set prices to equate the cost
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of adjusting prices today to a weighted average of current and future expected deviation of
marginal cost from marginal revenue. Therefore, under full price flexibility (i.e. ϕ = 0), firms
would always set prices to equate marginal revenue to marginal cost. At the other extreme,
when prices are fully rigid (i.e. ϕ → ∞) firms would set prices once and for all to equate an
average of current and future expected marginal revenues to an average of current and future
expected marginal costs.
2.3 Government
By controlling for the exchange-rate level Et, the government influences the relative price of
nontradables and is thus able to set the path for the inflation rate in the production sector,
which can be seen as representing the government’s monetary policy rule in this environment.3
To see more clearly how monetary policy operates, notice that any change in the relative price
of nontradables has an expenditure switching effect, and the demand for the nontradable good
is thus affected. This in turn requires a change in employment, which necessitates a change
in the equilibrium wage through households’ labor supply condition (7). Therefore, with its
action on the exchange rate, the government affects firms’ current marginal costs and thus
their price-setting decisions. It then follows that by setting the level of the exchange rate, the
government implicitly determines the path of the inflation rate.
The government also sets, once and for all, a constant labor subsidy τh which is financed
through a lump sum tax on firms such that the government budget is balanced:
τhWtht = Tt
I assume that this constant labor subsidy is set at the level that would be optimal under flexible
prices. This level, given by τh = 1/ε, would fully offset the monopoly distortion in that world.
2.4 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Given a constant labor tax τh and an exchange rate path {Et}∞t=0, a competitive equilibrium
is defined by stochastic sequences of allocations {cTt , cNt , bt+1, `t, ht}∞t=0 and prices {PNt ,Wt}∞t=0
such that: (a) agents maximize their lifetime utility (1) subject to the sequence of budget and
credit constraints given by (3) and (4) for t = 0, . . . ,∞, taking as given {PNt ,Wt}∞t=0; (b) the
markets for labor, nontradable goods and tradable goods clear at each date t. The market
3There exists a nominal interest rate that would implement this policy. This interest rate can be found by
introducing into the model a domestic bond that can be traded only among domestic households (its net supply
is equal to zero in equilibrium).
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clearing condition in the labor market, nontradable goods market and tradable goods market












cTt + bt+1 = y
T
t + (1 + r)bt (11)
I now turn to describing a competitive equilibrium in recursive form. The aggregate state
vector of the economy is (B, s) where B is the aggregate bond holdings and s is the exogenous
shocks realization. The state variables for an household’s optimization problem are the indi-
vidual bond holdings b, and the aggregate state (B, s). Denoting by Γ(B, s) the perceived law
of motion for aggregate bonds that households need to form expectations of future prices, and
by w(B, s) and pN(B, s) the respective pricing functions for labor and the nontradable good,
the optimization problem of households in recursive form is given by:




c(cT , cN), `
)
+ βEs′|sV (b′, B′, s′)





yT + w(B, s)`+ φ(B, s)
]
B′ = Γ(B, s)
The solution to this problem yields decision rules for individual bond holdings b̂′(b, B, s), labor
supply ˆ̀(b, B, s), tradable consumption ĉT (b, B, s) and nontradable consumption ĉN(b, B, s).
In a recursive rational expectations equilibrium, the law of motion for aggregate bonds must
coincide with the actual law of motion for aggregate bonds induced by the decision rule for
bond holdings, and given by b̂′(B,B, s). The firm j’s optimal pricing rule satisfies
















(1 + πN(B′, s′))πN(B′, s′)
]
(12)
In a symmetric equilibrium, the decision rules satisfy π̂Nj (B, s) = π̂
N(B, s) and ĥj(B, s) =
ĥ(B, s) for all firms. A recursive rational expectations equilibrium is defined below.
Definition 1 (Recursive Competitive Equilibrium). For a given government’s policy rule πNt (B, s),
a recursive competitive equilibrium is defined by pricing functions {w(B, s), pN(B, s)}, a per-
ceived law of motion for aggregate bond holdings Γ(B, s), firms’ policies {π̂N(B, s), ĥ(B, s)}, and
households’ decision rules {b̂′(b, B, s), ĉT (b, B, s), ĉN(b, B, s), ˆ̀(b, B, s)} with associated value




b̂′(b, B, s), ĉT (b, B, s), ĉN(b, B, s), ˆ̀(b, B, s)
}
and V (b, B, s) solve households’ recursive
optimization problem, taking as given w(B, s), pN(B, s) and Γ(B, s).
2. {π̂N(B, s), ĥ(B, s)} satisfies (12), taking as given w(B, s), pN(B, s) and πN(B, s).
3. The perceived law of motion for aggregate bonds and the government’s policy rule are
consistent with the actual law of motion for individual bonds and actual inflation policy,
respectively: Γ(B, s) = b̂′(B,B, s) and π(B, s) = π̂(B, s).
4. The labor market and the tradable good market clear
ĥ(B, s) = ˆ̀(B,B, s)
ĉT (B,B, s) + Γ(B, s) = yT + (1 + r)B
3 Optimal Policy Analysis
This section discusses the trade-off between macroeconomic stabilization and financial stabi-
lization that a policymaker faces in the model economy presented in the previous section and
formally characterizes the optimal time-consistent monetary policy.
I assume that the government (or central bank) lacks the ability to commit to future policies,
and chooses its policy instruments subject to the credit constraint and all others competitive
equilibrium conditions. Since the set of restrictions on the optimal policy includes forward-
looking constraints, namely the Euler equation for households (4) and an intertemporal pricing
rule for firms (10), the optimal policy setup amounts to a dynamic game between successive
governments. Thus, following Kein et al. (2008) and Bianchi and Mendoza (forthcoming), I
focus on Markov-stationary policy rules that are expressed as functions of the payoff-relevant
state variables (B, s). A Markov-perfect equilibrium is a fixed point in the policy rule chosen
by the government in any given period, taking as given the policy rule that represent the future
governments’ decisions. The key property of this fixed point is that the policy rule of the current
government matches the policy rules of future governments that the current government takes
as given to solve its optimization problem.
For the optimal policy analysis of this section, I focus on additively separable preferences,
that is preferences satisfying uc,` = 0.
4 This specification of preferences is common in analytical
4For the purpose of the quantitative analysis of Section 4, I follow the growing macro-finance literature
(for example Bianchi and Mendoza, forthcoming; Fornaro, 2015) in specifying households’ preferences following
Greenwood et al. (1988), where utility is defined in terms of the excess of consumption over the disutility of
labor, u(c−g(`)), with g(`) being twice-continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and convex. All the results
are robust to more general specification of preferences, especially for preferences specified following Greenwood
et al. (1988) where uc,` ≤ 0. Section 4 provides more details.
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studies of monetary policy open economy models (see for example Benigno and Benigno, 2003
and Gali and Monacelli, 2005).
3.1 Government’s Optimization Problem
Problem The formulation of the government optimal policy’s problem is standard, with the
government setting its policy to maximize the agents’ welfare subject to the resource, credit
and implementability constraints. Unlike private agents, the government internalizes the general
equilibrium effects of borrowing decisions on market prices. To simplify the description of the
government’s optimal policy problem, I introduce the concept of a labor wedge, defined as
the gap between firms’ marginal product of labor in the nontradable production sector and
households’ marginal rate of substitution between leisure and nontradable consumption:






The labor wedge is zero at efficient allocation. Let M(b, s) = (1 + π̂N(b, s))π̂N(b, s) be the
monetary policy rule of future governments that the current government takes as given, and
{C(b, s),L(b, s),B(b, s),V(b, s)} the equilibrium functions that return the values of the corre-
sponding variables under that policy rule. Taking these functions as given, the government’s
time-consistent problem in recursive form is:
V(b, s) = max









+ βEs′|sV(b′, s′) (14)


























= 0, µ ≥ 0 (20)




− ϕ`−1Es′|sΛ [L(b′, s′)M(b′, s′)] (21)
where the variables zt and ωt are respectively defined in (7) and (13). (15) is an intratemporal
implementability constraint, (16) is the resource constraint for the non-tradable good, (17) is
the resource constraint for the tradable good, (18) is the credit constraint, (19)-(20) are the
intertemporal implementability constraints associated with households’ borrowing choices, and
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(21) is the intertemporal implementability constraint associated with firms’ pricing decision
(i.e., the non-linear New Keynesian Philipps Curve). I denote the multiplier on (17), (18), (19)
by λ∗ ≥ 0, µ∗ ≥ 0 and υ ≥ 0. Note that λ∗ and µ∗ differ from λ and µ.
Aggregate demand externality Factoring the nontradable good’s demand (15) and re-
source constraint (16) into the period utility function, an indirect utility function can be de-














. The social marginal value of the

















There is thus a wedge between households’ private marginal value of the tradable good and this
social marginal value in equilibrium, due to the presence of an aggregate demand externality.
This wedge is proportional to the labor wedge net of the cost of inflation, weighted by the relative
expenditure share of the nontradable good relative to the tradable good.5 To understand the
source of this wedge, consider a marginal increase in households’ tradable good consumption.
Households only value this increase according to their private marginal utility uT (t). But as
they increase their consumption of tradables, households also demand more nontradables. And
since price adjustment is costly, this larger demand translates into a partial price adjustment as
well as into more nontradable good production. These price and production adjustments have
non-internalized welfare ramifications. The relevant nontradable output multiplier is given by




t , and the price
and employment adjustment detailed above create a net benefit of ωt− (ϕ/2)(πNt )2. Therefore,




t )(ωt − (ϕ/2)(πNt )2), which has a marginal
utility uT (t).
Pecuniary externality The second externality present in this environment is a pecuniary
externality originating from the credit constraint. To describe this externality, I compare the
government’s and households’ bond choices in the absence of nominal rigidities (i.e. for ϕ = 0).6
The government’s optimal decision for bonds in sequential form can be described by the two
5This result is in line with Farhi and Werning (2016). In a similar environment where firms sets their
prices once and for all, they highlight the existence of an aggregate demand externality and show that the
wedge between the social and private marginal values equals the weighted labor wedge; that is, the labor wedge
weighted by the relative expenditure share of nontradable goods relative to tradable goods.
6When prices are flexible (ϕ = 0), there is no role for the monetary policy due to the dichotomy between
nominal and real variables (see Lucas, 1972 and Caplin and Spulber, 1987).
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equations:7







λ∗t = βRtEtλ∗t+1 + µ∗t (24)
The difference between government solutions relative to the one based on households can be
seen by comparing (24) with the corresponding households’ optimality conditions (5). The
government’s shadow value of tradable consumption λ∗t is equal to the marginal utility of the
tradable consumption, uT (t), plus an additional term that represents the relaxation effect on
the credit constraint induced by the rise in the relative price of nontradables associated with
a marginally higher tradable consumption. The credit constraint relaxation term is absent
from the private condition (5). As emphasized in the normative macro-finance literature (see
Korinek, 2011 and Bianchi, 2011), this wedge between social and private valuations of tradable
consumption, when the credit constraint is binding, generates overborrowing at a time when it
is not binding. Indeed, when the credit constraint is not currently binding, households equate
the benefits uT (t) of an additional unit of borrowing to its private costs β(1 + r)EtuT (t + 1).







t . The additional cost, RtΘt+1, incurred by the government represents how
a one unit increase in borrowing at date t tightens the ability to borrow at date t + 1, which
has a marginal utility cost of µ∗t+1.
3.2 Time-Consistent Monetary Policy in Absence of Credit Frictions
I start the normative analysis by considering a case in which the economy features unconstrained
access to the international credit market. This economy can be regarded as a financially robust
economy in which either there is no credit constraint, or the credit coefficient κ is large enough
that the credit constraint never binds.8 In this case, the only constraint faced by agents on
their borrowing is their natural borrowing limit. The allocation of the competitive equilibrium
in this economy is the same as the one described in Section 2, but with µt = 0 for all t. This
case will serve as a benchmark.
The optimal policy solves (14) subject to (15)-(17), (19) with equality µt = 0 and (21). The
optimal policy problem amounts to choosing a path for the inflation rate of the nontradable
good to maximize private agents’ welfare. The following lemma describes the solution to this
7Because if the government decisions for bonds coincide with households decisions for bonds, the imple-
mentability constraint (19) would be always satisfied (that is, the associated multiplier would be equal to zero),
the multiplier on this constraint is set to zero in order to discuss the presence of the externality.
8Absence of a credit constraint or higher values of κ can be interpreted as representing a highly-developed
financial system in which households are able to borrow against a large share of their total income.
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problem.
Proposition 1 (Optimal Monetary Policy without Credit Frictions). With no credit frictions,
a price stability policy (i.e. πNt = 0 for all t) is the optimal monetary policy. It perfectly
stabilizes the economy (i.e. ωt = 0), and the allocation satisfies (6), (11), −u`(t) = AuN(t)
along with cNt = y
N
t = A`t.
Proof. See Appendix A.1
This result can be intuited from the observation that when there are no financial market
imperfections (no credit frictions), the only distortions in this economy arise from price stick-
iness. Hence, as is standard in the New Keynesian literature, the optimal monetary policy
eliminates the inefficiency stemming from sticky prices by making price adjustments unneces-
sary and production supply determined. Specifically, when the economy experiences a negative
tradable endowment shock, private agents feel poor and want to reduce their demand for both
goods. Firms in turn aim to adjust their price downward in response to the resulting decrease in
the demand for nontradables. The optimal policy thus features an exchange rate depreciation
that generates expenditure switching toward the nontradable good and renders an adjustment
of the price of the nontradable good unnecessary. Because the labor tax is assumed to be set
optimally to completely offset monopolistic distortions, the resulting allocation is efficient.
3.3 Time-Consistent Monetary Policy without Capital Flow Taxes
I now turn to analyzing the optimal policy in an economy featuring limited access to the
international credit market. The optimal policy under free capital mobility solves (14) subject
to (15)-(21). The two aforementioned externalities create policy trade-offs in the presence of
credit frictions, and a price stability policy is generally not optimal. The proposition below
characterizes the optimal time-consistent monetary policy in this case.
Proposition 2 (Optimal Monetary Policy without Capital Flow Taxes). In the presence of




t = ωt + (1− γ−1)
κ
uT (t)




where ∆t is the sum of three terms.
9 As a result, price stability is always optimal in the knife-
edge case where γ = σ = 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.2
9∆t = ∆o,t +Et[Λt,t+1`t+1(1+πNt+1)]ϑtπNt+1 +(1/2)πNt with ∆o,t > 0. Appendix A.2 provides further details.
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This proposition states that the optimal path of the inflation rate is a linear equation that
is a function of the labor wedge, Lagrange multipliers on the credit constraint (18) and house-
holds’ Euler (19), with coefficients given by substitution elasticities. The basic idea of this
proposition is as follows. There are distortions arising from price stickiness (output loss and
aggregate demand externalities) and from credit frictions (the pecuniary and the aggregate
demand externalities). A price stability policy eliminates the inefficiency stemming from price
stickiness at the costs of making private agents overborrow ex ante, and causing them to over-
consume the tradable good ex post. Hence, the government has an incentive to deviate from
solely granting price stability. The effectiveness of the monetary policy in correcting the pecu-
niary externality when the constraint is not binding depends on how an increase in the tradable
consumption affects households’ private marginal utility of tradables (that is, their cost of bor-
rowing), which is captured by the difference between the intratemporal and the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. Likewise, the effectiveness of the monetary policy in correcting the
demand externality when the constraint binds depends on how an increase in the tradable con-
sumption affects the value of the collateral, which is captured by the intratemporal elasticity of
substitution. The optimal time-consistent monetary policy thus strikes a compromise between
price stability and financial stability.
In the discussion that follows, a boom is defined as a situation in which the labor wedge in
the economy is lower than its level under flexible price allocation, in line with the general class
of monetary policy open economy models.10 The remarks below provide further details on the
characterization of the optimal policy.
Remark 1 (Prudential Monetary Policy). When the credit constraint does not currently bind, a
price stability policy is optimal if and only if γ = 1/σ and it stabilizes the economy. Further, the
current government optimally deviates from price stability policy to generate a boom if γ > 1/σ;
and a recession if γ < 1/σ.
This remark adds further insights and describes how monetary policy is used as a prudential
tool. Because under a price stability policy private agents overborrow ex ante, the government
does not use monetary policy solely to make any adjustments in the prices of nontradables
unnecessary, but also to address the pecuniary externality. When the intratemporal elasticity of
substitution is greater than the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (i.e., when γ > 1/σ), an
expansionary monetary policy generating a boom in the nontradable sector reduces households’
marginal propensity to consume the tradable good and addresses overborrowing. Likewise,
10In this class of models (see, among others, Gali and Monacelli, 2005 and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2007),
there is a boom when the level of output is above its natural level, which is defined as the output level under
flexible price allocation.
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when the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is less than the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (i.e. when γ < 1/σ), a contractionary monetary policy generates a recession in
the nontradable sector and reduces households’ marginal propensity to consume the tradable
good, thus also addressing overborrowing.
In the knife-edge case where γ = 1/σ, the intratemporal and the intertemporal effects of the
monetary policy stance on tradable consumption cancel each other out, and generating either
a boom or a bust in the nontradable sector is impotent to address overborrowing. Therefore, in
this case, the government only focuses on price stability and replicates flexible price allocation.
Remark 2 (Ex Post Policy). When the credit constraint binds, the current government opti-
mally stabilizes prices which generates a boom in the economy when γ ≥ 1. When γ < 1, the
current government optimally deviates from a price stability policy and generates a recession.
When the credit constraint binds, the social marginal value of tradable consumption is
VT (t) =
[






with ωt = −κµt/uT (t) < 0, and households over-consume the
tradable good. The government then faces a trade-off between price stability and the relaxation
of the credit constraint to address the aggregate demand externality. When the intratemporal





t < 0). Thus, in order to relax the constraint, the government would need to create
a boom, which would amplify the effect of the aggregate demand externality. Therefore, the
current government has no incentive to deviate from a price stability policy. In contrast, when
the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is less than 1 (γ < 1), the price effect dominates the
quantity effect. The current government then finds it optimal to deviate from a price stability
policy to create a recession in order to sustain the value of the collateral, which in turn mitigates
the aggregate demand externality.
Discussion An important result of this section is that in an economy featuring an endoge-
nous sudden mechanism; that is, in the presence of credit frictions, a price stability policy
is optimal under special conditions, γ = 1/σ ≥ 1. While monetary policy is countercyclical
in almost all developed countries, Vegh and Vuletin (2012) document that it is procyclical
in 51 percent of developing countries (24 countries out of 47) in their sample for the period
1960-2009.11 This section highlights conditions under which procyclical monetary policy can
be optimal in an economy in which financial markets are imperfect, capital flows freely and
the government lacks commitment. Remarks 1 and 2 together show that the optimal time-
consistent monetary policy is procyclical when the intratemporal elasticity is greater than the
11The procyclicality of the monetary policy is measured by the correlation between the cyclical components
of short-term interest rates and real GDP.
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intertemporal elasticity and the former is less than 1 (1/σ < γ < 1). The basic idea here is that
lowering the degree of nominal rigidity is not always welfare increasing due to the tradeoff be-
tween price and financial stability documented in this environment. During crisis periods (that
is periods in which the constraint binds) a contractionary monetary policy slackens the credit
constraint when γ < 1. In these circumstances, at the margin there are gains from moving
away from a price stability policy to relax the credit constraint and restrain capital outflows.
Furthermore, in advance of crisis periods (that is periods in which the credit constraint does
not bind), a procyclical monetary policy induces private agents to accumulate a desirable level
of precautionary savings. Once again, at the margin the gain from this policy is higher than
the cost of inflation.
3.4 Time-Consistent Monetary Policy with Capital Flow Taxes
I now consider the possibility of the government having an additional policy instrument con-
sisting in capital flow taxes and look at how the availability of this additional tool affects the







Rt(1 + τ bt )
= yTt + wt`t + φt + bt + Tt
where Tt represents a lump-sum transfer that households receive from the government. The
households’ Euler equation for bonds becomes:
uT (t) = βRt(1 + τ
b
t )EtuT (t+ 1) + µt (25)
Given quantities, the tax on debt can be used to back out households’ Euler equation. It
turns out that allowing the government to use capital taxes is equivalent to assuming that it
controls the credit operations of households and rebates back the proceeds of the transactions
in a lump-sum fashion. Hence, the government’s optimal policy problem amounts to choosing
the path for the inflation rate and making debt choices for households, while allowing them
to choose their labor supply and their allocation of consumption between tradable goods and
nontradable goods in a competitive way. The government’s optimization problem thus reduces
to solving (14) subject to (15)-(18) and (21).12 The following proposition characterizes the
optimal monetary policy in an economy with credit frictions when capital flow taxes are used
optimally.
Proposition 3 (Optimal Policy under Availability of Capital Flow Taxes). When capital flow
12Appendix A.3 shows that any allocation that satisfies (15)-(18) and (21) also satisfies the general equilibrium.
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Proof. See Appendix A.3
This proposition provides insight into how the availability of capital flow taxes changes the
optimal monetary policy. When the credit constraint binds, the design of the optimal monetary
policy is quite similar to that in an economy where capital flow taxes cannot be used. In that
case, the optimal time-consistent monetary policy is a compromise between two objectives: cor-
recting nominal rigidities (macroeconomic stability) and relaxing the credit constraint to correct
aggregate demand externalities (financial stability). The government optimally stabilizes prices
to creates a boom in the nontradable sector if the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is
less than 1 (γ < 1), and deviates from a price stability policy to create a recession if γ > 1.
However, monetary policy is qualitatively different from the case where capital flow taxes are
not available when the credit constraint does not currently bind. In this case, capital flow taxes
appear to be the preferred tool for correcting the pecuniary externality.
The proposition also shows that the conditions under which a price stability policy is optimal
in the absence of capital flow taxes are a subset of those when capital flow taxes are available and
used optimally. In the latter, the optimal time-consistent monetary policy is a price stability
policy when γ ≥ 1, while in the former a price stability policy is optimal only under the more
restrictive aforementioned conditions (γ = 1/σ ≥ 1).
4 Quantitative Analysis
This section evaluates the quantitative implications of the model. I solve numerically for the
problem of the government, under both free capital mobility and availability of capital flow
taxes, using global non-linear methods. I also compute numerically the competitive equilibrium
in which the monetary policy is characterized by a price stability policy.
4.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated to annual data from Argentina. Preferences in this section are speci-
fied following Greenwood et al. (1988) where the argument of u(·) is the composite commodity
ct− g(`t) and g(`t) is a function that measures the disutility of the labor supply. This formula-
tion of preferences allows international real business cycle models to explain observed business
cycle facts, and delivers realistic/empirically plausible, dynamics for employment in emerging
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economies. The functional forms for preferences are:








The international interest rate is set to 4 percent, a standard value for the world risk-free
interest rate in the real business cycle literature for small open economies. The coefficient of
relative risk aversion is set to σ = 2, also a standard value. In line with evidence by Kimball
and Shapiro (2008), the Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1/θ is set to 1. The labor disutility
parameter χ is set so that mean employment in the nontradable sector is equal to 1, which
requires χ = 0.69. The value of the total factor productivity (TFP) in the nontradable sector
is normalized to 1. The elasticity of substitution among differentiated intermediate goods ε is
set to 7.66, corresponding to a 15% net markup that is in the range found by Diewert and Fox
(2008). I also set the Rotemberg price adjustment cost parameter to ensure that nominal prices
are sticky for three quarters on average, which requires ϕ = 62.13 The process for the exogenous
driving forces st = (y
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where [εTt , ε
R
t ] ∼ i.i.d. N(0,Σ2ε)
I estimate this process by OLS with the risk-free rate and the cyclical component of tradable
GDP from the World Development Indicators for the 1965-2014 period. The risk-free rate
is measured by a U.S. real interest rate (Treasury-bill rate, deflated with expected U.S. CPI
inflation). The tradable endowment is measured with the cyclical component of value added in











and R̄ = 1.0219
The vector of shocks is discretized into a first-order Markov process, with seventeen points, using
the quadrature-based procedure of Tauchen and Hussey (1991). The mean of the endowment
is set to 1 without loss of generality.
13The parameter ϕ is set to ensure that the first-order approximation of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve
(NKPC), equation (10) in the Rotemberg model, is equivalent to the one in a Calvo model where firms keep










Risk aversion σ = 2 Standard value
Frisch elasticity parameter θ = 1 Kimball and Shapiro (2008)
Elasticity of substitution γ = 0.83 Conservative value
Monopoly power ε = 7.66 15% net markup
Adjustment cost parameter ϕ = 62 Three quarter of price stickiness
Discount factor β = 0.905 Average NFA-GDP ratio = -29%
Weight on tradables in CES a = 0.315 Share of tradable output = 32%
Collateral coefficient κ = 0.319 Frequency of crisis = 5.5%
Labor disutility coefficient χ = 0.686 Mean labor = 1
TFP in nontradable sector A = 1 Normalization
The parameters {γ, β, a, κ} are calibrated following the baseline calibration of Bianchi
(2011). The calibration strategy consists in choosing values for the parameters so that the
model economy in which the monetary policy is characterized by a price stability policy matches
some key aspects of the Argentina data. The intratemporal elasticity of substitution between
tradable and nontradable goods, γ, is set to a conservative value of 0.83. The three parameters
{β, a, κ} are respectively set so that the long-run moments of the competitive equilibrium match
the following three historical moments of the data: (i) an average net foreign asset position
to GDP of −29 percent, (ii) a share of tradable goods in production of 32 percent and (iii)
an observed frequency of 5.5 percent of ”Sudden Stops” . Sudden Stops are defined as events
in which the credit constraint binds, and this leads to an increase in net capital outflows that
exceeds one standard deviation. This approach leads to β = 0.905, a = 0.315 and κ = 0.319.
4.2 Policy Functions
I start by analyzing the policy functions under different monetary regimes. I consider an
inflation targeting regime in which the policy rule is set to stabilize the producer price index
by offsetting all of the distortions originating from nominal rigidities, and there is no tax on
capital. This regime captures the price stability objective of central banks. I also consider
time-consistent regimes with and without capital flow taxes, under which the monetary policy
is characterized by the optimal time-consistent monetary policy rules derived in section 3.3.
Figure 1 plots the decision rules as a function of the current holdings of bonds for a negative
one-standard deviation shock. The presence of the endogenous borrowing constraint generates
a kink in the policy function, and the bond decision rule is non-monotonic. I distinguish two
different regions in each panel below focusing on the change in the slope of the borrowing
decision rule under an inflation targeting regime, which occurs at the point where the credit
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Time-Consistent Policy without CFT
Time-Consistent Policy with CFT
Figure 1: Decision rules for negative one-standard-deviation shocks
constraint binds. The solid red line corresponds to the bond decision rule under an inflation
targeting regime. The dashed blue line and the dashed-dotted black line corresponds to the bond
decision rule under a time-consistent regime, with and without capital flow taxes, respectively.
The constrained region (shaded region) represents the situations in which the current debt
level is sufficiently high such that the credit constraint binds under an inflation targeting regime.
In this region, under an inflation targeting regime, by the market clearing condition for the
tradable good (11) for a given choice of next-period level of debt, an increase in the current level
of debt would imply a decrease in tradable consumption. Notice that because the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution is less than 1 (γ < 1), the price effect dominates the quantity effect.
Thus, the decrease of the relative price of nontradables dominates the increase in the demand
of nontradables that accompanies the decrease in tradable consumption, which means that the
next-period level of debt must be decreased further to satisfy the credit constraint.
Under both time-consistent regimes, the government uses its policy instrument (here, the
exchange rate) to increase the relative price of nontradables and sustain the value of the col-
lateral, which means that households can borrow more. Moreover, the increase in the relative
price of nontradables implies a lower marginal cost. Thus, for a given future government pol-
icy, monopolistically competitive firms reduce prices of the nontradable good by equation (10),
which in turn generates a lower level of inflation when compared to its level under the inflation
targeting regime.
In the unconstrained region, which corresponds to the state-space where the credit constraint
does not bind, under a monetary regime that replicates flexible price allocation (an inflation
targeting regime), households do not accumulate sufficient precautionary savings, due to the
presence of the pecuniary externality. Under time-consistent regimes, the government also uses
its policy instruments to increase the cost of borrowing and prevent a larger drop in households’
borrowing ability if the credit constraint becomes binding in the next period. Without capital
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flow taxes (CFT), given future policies lowering the exchange rate level to increase the relative
price of nontradables has two effects: an intertemporal effect that reduces the cost of borrowing
since it is relatively cheaper to purchase debt, and an intratemporal effect that increases the cost
of borrowing since the nontradable good is relatively more expensive. As shown in Proposition 2,
since the intertemporal effect dominates (σ > 1/γ), the optimal policy is expansionary and thus
generates a higher level of debt. Furthermore, a higher relative price of nontradables implies
that firms face lower marginal costs and then adjust their nominal prices downward according to
their optimal pricing decision given by equation (10). The inflation rate under an optimal time-
consistent regime without capital flow taxes thus turns out to be lower than under an inflation
targeting regime. Under the time-consistent regime with capital flow taxes, the government
uses taxes to control for households’ credit operations and the monetary policy focuses only on
stabilizing prices, as implied by Proposition 3. Thus, households accumulate uniformly lower
levels of debt, which in turn help contain the rise in the relative price of nontradables under a
flexible price allocation and prevent a larger drop in households’ borrowing ability if the credit
constraint becomes binding in the next period.
4.3 Monetary Regimes and the Dynamics of Financial Crises
This section analyzes the costs and gains associated with the adoption of an inflation targeting
regime as opposed to a time-consistent regime, in an economy in which capital flows are free.
4.3.1 Economic Behavior During Crises
To describe the effectiveness of a time-consistent regime in reducing the severity of crises, I
construct an event analysis using simulated data and analyze the dynamics of the economy
during financial crises. A financial crisis is defined as a period in which the credit constraint
is binding, and in which the current account is one standard deviation above its mean in the
ergodic distribution corresponding to the economy under each monetary regime.
The construction of the event analysis follows the procedure proposed by Bianchi and Men-
doza (forthcoming). First, the model economy under an inflation targeting regime is simulated
for 500,000 periods. After dropping the first 1,000 periods and identifying all of the crisis events
under an inflation targeting regime, I construct five-year event windows centered in the period
in which the crisis takes place. Then at each period, I compute averages for each simulated
variable across the event windows in each year t−2 to t+2, and produce the economic dynamic
under an inflation targeting regime. An initial value for bonds and a five-year sequence of trad-
able realizations is determined by calculating the median initial debt at t− 3, and the median
tradable shock across a cross-section of crisis events. Finally, I feed this sequence of shocks
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Current Account to GDP
Inflation Targeting Policy Time-Consistent Policy without CFT Time-Consistent Policy with CFT
Figure 2: Comparison of crises dynamics
Note: The real exchange rate, tradable consumption, consumption and GDP are expressed in percentage devi-
ations from averages in the ergodic distribution.
and initial value of bonds into the decision rules of the model economy under time-consistent
regimes and compute the corresponding endogenous variables.14 The model’s predictions during
financial crises for both monetary regimes is depicted by Figure 2.
The top middle panel shows that, under the time-consistent regime without capital flow
taxes, there is a negative inflation rate in the run-up to crises. The reduction of the inflation
level (-3.0 percent) is more important in the year of the crisis. In this way, the government
allows for more credit access, and the economy under this monetary regime features more debt
than the economy under an inflation targeting regime during crises but also in the years before
and after the occurrence of the crises (see the bottom right panel). As a result, consumption
of the tradable good falls by a much smaller percentage during crises than it does the under
the inflation targeting regime (-28.1 vs. -33.3 percent). This relatively large fall of tradable
14This procedure ensures that the dynamics under each model economy are simulated using the same initial
state and the same sequence of shocks.
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consumption under the inflation targeting regime arises because the binding credit constraint
forces households to reduce their next period level of debt, as captured by the sharp reversal of
the current account-to-GDP ratio. Under the time-consistent regime, the government generates
a boom ahead of financial crises and a recession during crises, as measured by the negative labor
wedge, to sustain the value of the collateral. As a consequence, the fall in the real exchange rate
is smaller during crises (-6.0 vs. -27.5 percent under the inflation targeting regime), which in
turn mitigates the drop-in output and absorption during crises. The middle panel of Figure 2
shows that, in contrast to a time-consistent regime, decline in the total output and consumption
is larger under inflation targeting: total output and consumption drop by 21.9 and 18.0 percent,
respectively, under the time-consistent regime (vs. 29.7 percent for total output and 18.8 percent
for consumption under the inflation targeting regime).
4.3.2 Economic Behavior ahead of Potential Crises
I now turn to analyzing the impact of monetary policy on debt accumulation and the fre-
quency of crises in sudden stop-prone economies. In the absence of capital flow taxes, because
households in an economy under an inflation targeting regime fail to accumulate sufficient pre-
cautionary savings due to the pecuniary externality, the government optimally deviates from a
price stability policy to sustain the value of the collateral ahead of a potential financial crisis.
Therefore, as shown in figure 3, the economy under the time-consistent regime is likely to have
higher debt than the economy under an inflation targeting regime. Formally, there is a 7.6 per-
cent chance that households in the economy under the time-consistent regime carry an amount
of debt larger than -1.0, which corresponds to the maximum amount of debt that households































Time-Consistent Policy without CFT
Figure 3: Distribution of bond holdings.
in the economy under an inflation targeting regime can hold. It is then apparent that the
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long-run probability of financial crises is 12.7 percent under the time-consistent regime versus
5.5 percent under an inflation targeting regime.
4.3.3 Monetary Policy and Capital Controls
The use of capital controls in the form of capital flow taxes along with a time-consistent mone-
tary policy appears to be very effective in reducing the magnitude of crises as shown in Figure
2. Ahead of potential financial crises, taxes are used to diminish households’ debt and re-
strain the boom in tradable consumption. This in turn prevents a larger drop in households’
borrowing ability during crises, as captured by the smaller reversal of the current account-to-
GDP ratio. The decline in tradable consumption, aggregate consumption and total output
are thus smaller than their decline under both the time-consistent regime without capital flow
taxes and the inflation targeting regime. Moreover, since the government uses taxes on debt to
encourage households to accumulate sufficient precautionary savings, the economy under the
time-consistent regime is less vulnerable to financial crises.
Table 2: Probability and severity of crises
Inflation Targeting Time-Consistent
no CFT with CFT no CFT with CFT
Probability of crises 05.5 01.3 12.7 1.1
Current-Account to GDP 09.6 02.4 6.2 2.1
Real exchange rate depreciation 27.5 11.4 6.1 8.3
Output
average -29.7 -17.8 -21.9 -17.2
P(ŷ < −20%) -87.7 -24.4 -80.3 -14.8
Consumption
average -18.8 -9.6 -18.0 -9.2
P(ĉ < −15%) -83.3 -8.1 -78.9 -7.2
Note: Consumption, output and real exchange rate are expressed in percentage deviations from averages in
the corresponding ergodic distribution.
Table 2 highlights the importance of capital flow taxes in reducing the long-run frequency of
crises regardless of the monetary regime. The long-run probability of crises is 1.1 percent under
a time-consistent regime with capital flow taxes, and 1.3 percent under an inflation targeting
regime with capital flow taxes (vs. 5.5 percent an under inflation targeting regime, and 12.7
percent under a time-consistent regime). Table 2 also points out the role of capital flow taxes
in reducing the severity of crises. Because monetary policy is less effective in correcting the
pecuniary externality, the drop in capital inflows is more pronounced when capital flows taxes
are not available. The probability that the decline in total output will exceed 20 percent is
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80.3 percent under a time-consistent regime, and 14.8 percent under a time-consistent regime
with capital flow taxes (87.7 percent under inflation targeting vs. 24.4 percent under inflation
targeting with capital flow taxes). Further, the probability that the consumption will drop by
more than 15 percent is 78.9 percent under a time-consistent regime, and 7.2 percent under a
time-consistent regime with capital flow taxes (83.3 percent under inflation targeting vs. 8.1
percent under inflation targeting with capital flow taxes). These results from Table 2 suggests
that monetary policy should be supplemented with capital flows taxes.
Another important result is that the design of the monetary policy also affects the optimal
tax rate on debt. It is apparent that the optimal tax rate under the time-consistent regime is
higher than under the inflation targeting regime. On average, tax on debt is about 6.1 percent
under a time-consistent regime and 5.0 percent under an inflation targeting regime. This finding
can be inferred from the fact that under a time-consistent regime, the government uses its
monetary policy to allow for more credit access during crises. Further, because future choices
of bond holdings affect current optimal choices, the government needs to raise (relatively)
more taxes in order to cause households to accumulate a socially desirable level of debt. This
additional result suggests that monetary policy and macroprudential policy are complementary.
4.4 Long-run moments
The table below depicts unconditional second moments computed using the ergodic distribu-
tion for the economy under each monetary regime considered. In line with the macro-finance
literature, this model, which incorporates an occasionally binding credit constraints, accounts
for some key regularities of the business cycles of emerging countries: the variability in GDP
is higher than the variability in consumption and the strong procyclicality of capital flows.
Furthermore, Table 3 points toward strong effects of monetary regimes on the volatility of the
macroeconomic indicators, especially GDP, consumption, unemployment, and real exchange
rate.
The first result from Table 3 enhances the existence of a trade-off between the variability
in GDP and employment. Indeed, compared to the economy under a time-consistent regime,
the economy under an inflation targeting regime features lower business cycle variability in
employment and consumption, pointing to the importance of price stability policy in absorbing
shocks and stabilizing employment. By stimulating employment and reducing the variability in
the relative price of nontradables during episodes of financial crises, a time-consistent regime
lowers the volatility of the real exchange rate, the current account-to-GDP ratio, and the trade
balance-to-GDP ratio. Table 3 further highlights the strong role of capital flow taxes in stabi-
lizing the economy regardless the monetary regime considered. As discussed by Bianchi (2011)
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Table 3: Second Moments
Inflation Targeting Time-Consistent Data
no CFT with CFT no CFT with CFT
Standard Deviations
Consumption 5.4 5.2 7.3 5.7 6.2
Employment 2.3 2.8 5.3 3.4 2.9
Real Exchange Rate 8.5 6.7 6.5 5.9 8.2
Current Account-GDP 2.9 1.3 2.0 1.2 3.0
Trade Balance-GDP 3.1 1.4 2.1 1.2 2.8
Correlation with GDP
Consumption 0.93 0.98 0.88 0.96 0.88
Employment 0.80 0.99 0.69 0.95 0.74
Current Account-GDP -0.65 -0.54 -0.59 -0.54 -0.63
Notes: Data are annual from WDI and Global Financial Data (GFD). Data period covers 1965-2014.
and Fornaro (2015), there are two main reasons for this to happen: the probability of crises
is much larger in an economy where capital flow taxes are not available, and the externalities
interfere with households’ desire to smooth consumption over time. Clearly, when there is a
bad shock and the credit constraint binds, households are forced to reduce their debt, which in
turn generates a countercyclical current account balance-to-GDP ratio. Thus, the correlation of
the current account-to-GDP ratio with the GDP is key to explaining the role played by capital
flow taxes in smoothing consumption. From table 3, the lowest countercyclicality of the current
account-to-GDP ratio is obtained when capital flow taxes are used optimally. The consumption
smoothing therefore works better under a monetary regime with capital flow taxes.
4.5 Welfare Effects
The welfare implications of a monetary regime for each initial state, denoted λ(b, s), is defined
as the percent variation in the lifetime consumption stream that equalizes the expected utility
of an household living in the economy under an inflation targeting regime (IT) to the expected
utility of an household living in an economy under the alternative monetary regime (GP)
considered. Formally, for each initial state (b, s), the welfare implications of the alternative
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where cst and `
s
t denote consumption and labor supply allocations under the monetary regime
s ∈ {IT,GP}. Figure 4 depicts the welfare gains of moving away from an inflation targeting
regime to an alternative monetary regime as a function of the current level of bond holdings,
and for negative, one standard deviation shocks.































Time-Consistent Policy without CFT
Time-Consistent Policy with CFT
Inflation Targeting Policy with CFT
Figure 4: Welfare gains/costs of moving away from inflation targeting regime.
First, in the unconstrained region, the monetary regimes with capital flows taxes deliver
larger welfare gains. This is because with capital flow taxes used by the government to address
the pecuniary externality, households living in an economy under one of the monetary regimes
with capital flow taxes act in a more precautionary way and the welfare increases. Furthermore,
Figure 4 shows that there are welfare losses from adopting a time-consistent regime without
capital flow taxes. The rationale is that under a time-consistent regime, the government se-
lects the best action given the current situation, which does not result in the social objective
function being maximized. Rather, by relying on the inflation targeting policy rules, economic
performance is improved (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). Secondly, in the region where the
credit constraint binds, comparing the welfare effects under the time-consistent regime without
capital flow taxes and under the inflation targeting regime with capital flow taxes, it is apparent
that monetary policy is more effective in correcting the externalities than capital flow taxes. In
this region, the time-consistent monetary policy sustains the value of the collateral, allows for
more credit access and thus significantly improve the welfare. It is also important to notice that
there are benefits from using capital controls under the inflation targeting regime, in contrast
to the previous studies (e.g. Bianchi, 2011 and Ottonello, 2015) where the welfare gain from
using capital flow taxes under a policy that replicates the flexible price allocation arises only
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in relation to how future allocations will differ. The reason is that, in this environment, when
the credit constraint binds, capital flow taxes are used to offset the intratemporal distortion in
the labor supply decision and stabilize the economy.
I also calculate the average welfare gain λ̄ as the average λ(b, s) computed with the ergodic
distribution in the economy under the inflation targeting regime. Because the time-consistent
monetary policy without capital flow taxes only delivers welfare gains in the constrained region,
and the economy under the inflation targeting regime without capital flow taxes spends less
than 16 percent of the time in this region, on average there is a welfare cost of adopting the
time-consistent regime rather than the inflation targeting regime, which corresponds to 0.04
percent of permanent consumption. Another key result of this welfare analysis indicates the
importance of capital flows taxes in changing the desirable property of the time-consistent
regime. The time-consistent regime with capital flow taxes delivers the largest welfare gain
(0.27 percent of permanent consumption). In comparison, the welfare gain from using capital
flow taxes under the inflation targeting regime is 0.21 percent of permanent consumption.
5 Conclusion
In a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of an open economy featuring nominal
rigidities and credit constraint that limits borrowing to a fraction of borrowers’ current income,
I study the optimal time-consistent monetary policy. Theoretically, the optimal time-consistent
monetary policy is expressed in close form as a linear equation that is a function of the labor
wedge and variables that account for financial conditions before and during periods in which
the credit constraint binds. A price stability policy is not generally optimal. In particular,
when the intratemporal elasticity is greater than the intertemporal elasticity and the former
is less than one, the optimal time-consistent monetary policy is procyclical. Conditions under
which a price stability policy is optimal are less restrictive when capital flow taxes are available.
Quantitatively, relative to the outcome of a simple inflation targeting regime, financial crises
are more likely to occur but will be less severe when they do under a monetary regime that
implements the time-consistent policy. Moreover, the quantitative analysis suggests that there
is much to be gained when monetary policy and macroprudential regulation such as capital
controls are conducted jointly. Capital controls are found to be more effective in correcting the
externality stemming from credit frictions, which in turn reduce excessive risk exposure of the
economy, and result in higher social welfare.
30
References
Acharya, Sushant and Julien Bengui, “Liquidity Traps, Capital Flows,” 2015. manuscript,
University of Montreal.
Aghion, Philippe, Philippe Bacchetta, and Abhijit Banerjee, “A corporate balance-
sheet approach to currency crises,” Journal of Economic Theory, 2004, 119 (1), 6–30.
Bengui, Julien and Javier Bianchi, “Capital Flow Management when Capital Controls
Leak,” 2014. Mimeo, University of Montreal.
Benigno, Gianluca and Pierpaolo Benigno, “Price Stability in Open Economies,” Review
of Economic Studies, 2003, 70 (4), 743–764.
, Huigang Chen, Christopher Otrok, Alessandro Rebucci, and Eric Young, “Mon-
etary and Macro-Prudential Policies: An Integrated Analysis,” 2011. Mimeo, London School
of Economics.
, , , , and , “Financial crises and macroprudential policies,” Journal of International
Economics, 2013, 89 (2), 453–470.
Bianchi, Javier, “Overborrowing and systemic externalities in the business cycle,” American
Economic Review, 2011, 101 (7), 3400–3426.
and Enrique Mendoza, “Optimal time-consistent macroprudential policy,” Journal of
Political Economy, forthcoming.
Braggion, Fabio, Lawrence Christiano, and Jorge Roldos, “Optimal monetary policy
in a ’sudden stop’,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 2009, 56.
Caballero, Ricardo and Avrind Krishnamurthy, “Inflation targeting and sudden stops,”
2003. NBER Working Paper No. 9599.
Calvo, Guillermo, “Capital flows and capital-markets crises: The simple economics of sudden
stops,” Journal of Applied Economics, 1998, 1 (1), 35–54.
Caplin, Andrew and Daniel Spulber, “Menu Costs and the Neutrality of Money,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987, 102 (4), 703–726.
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The government’s time-consistent problem in recursive form is rewritten here for convenience:
V(b, s) = max




































µ ≥ 0 (A.7)




− ϕ`−1Es′|sΛ [L(b′, s′)M(b′, s′)] (A.8)
Let λ∗ ≥ 0 and µ∗ ≥ 0 be the multiplier on the resource constraint for tradables and the credit
constraint respectively; ι ≥ 0, υ ≥ 0, δ, χ ≥ 0 and ξ be the multiplier on (A.2), (A.5)-(A.7),




−ϕ`−1Es′|sΛ [L(b′, s′)M(b′, s′)].
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In the absence of credit frictions, the government’s optimisation problem reduces to solving
(A.1) subject to (A.2), (A.3), (A.5) with equality µt = 0 and (A.8). The proof proceeds by
analyzing a relaxed problem where the government is not subject to (A.5) and then showing
that this condition is satisfied. Abstracting from the implementability constraint (A.5), the
government’s optimality conditions, after eliminating the multiplier ι in the key equations, are:
cTt :: λ
∗
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(A.11)







Consider now a price stability policy, πNt = 0 for all t. Under this policy, by equation (A.12),
it follows that ξt = 0. Substituting into (A.11) implies that ωt = 0, and into (A.9) implies that
λ∗t = uT (t). Using the latter together with (A.10) leads to:
uT (t) = βRtEtuT (t+ 1).
The implementability constraint (A.5) is then satisfied. Therefore, a price stability policy is
optimal and it stabilizes the economy (i.e. ωt = 0).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
To characterize the optimal time-consistent monetary policy, I solve for the government’s op-
timization problem (A.1) given that future path of the inflation rate M are chosen by future
government with which are associated with policies {C(b, s),L(b, s),B(b, s),V(b, s)}.
The optimality conditions of the government problem (A.1), after eliminating the multiplier
ι in the key equations, are given by:
cTt :: λ
∗















t = βRtEtλ∗t+1 + µ̃∗t + βRtEt
∂uT (t+ 1)
∂bt+1
υt + ξtψb′,t (A.14)
























+ (1− γ−1)µ̃∗tκpNt yNt
+ (σ − γ−1)cT (t)
ct
cNt uN(t)υt = ξt
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γ−1pNt ψp,t − `tψ`,t
)
(A.16)






These expressions are obtained by assuming that the policies and value functions are differ-
entiable, with µ̃∗t = µ
∗
t + δtµt that represents the government’s effective shadow value on the
credit constraint. It can also be shown that µ̃∗t = µ
∗
t for all t. To clearly see this, notice first
that when the constraint does not binds (i.e. µ∗t = 0), the implementability constraint (A.6) is




t = 0. When the





Combining (A.16) with (A.17) and rearranging the expression yields
ϕ∆tuN(t)π
N





To simplify the notation, I define ι̃t ≡ ιt/(1+2πNt )uN(t), the auxiliary variable ∆t is then given
by ∆t = ι̃t(γ
−1pNt ψp,t − `tψ`,t) + (1/2)πNt , which can be rewritten as:
























The equilibrium under the optimal time-consistent monetary policy can be characterized by
sequences {cTt , cNt , `t, bt+1, µt, πNt , pNt }∞t=0 that satisfy (4)-(8), (10), (11) along with the comple-
mentary slackness condition and (A.18).
Because the optimal time-consistent monetary policy is characterized by a fixed point in the
policy rules chosen by the government, to characterize conditions under which a price stability
policy is optimal in this environment, I start by assuming that future governments choose
their policy instrument to stabilize prices (i.e πNt+1 = 0). Then, I characterize conditions under
which the current government stabilizes prices. Finally, I show whether the current government
deviates from a price stability policy to create a boom or a recession in the economy.
Let’s assume that πNt+1 = 0. From the implementability constraint (A.5) that combines (7)
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)
+ (σ − γ−1)cT (t)
ctyNt
cNt υt (A.20)
When the credit constraint does not bind (i.e. µ∗t = 0), it follows from the complementary
slackness condition (A.6) that µt = 0 and µ̃
∗















Therefore, the current government also stabilizes prices, i.e. πNt = 0, if and only if γ = 1/σ. This
policy stabilizes the economy, ωt = 0, by equation (A.19). Moreover for γ > 1/σ, the current
government deviate from a price stability policy, πNt > 0. This in turn implies by (A.19) that
the economy experiences a boom, ωt < 0. Conversely, for γ < 1/σ, the current government
deviate from a price stability policy, πNt < 0, and the economy experiences a recession, ωt > 0.
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When the credit constraint binds (i.e. µ∗t 6= 0), the optimality condition (A.15) becomes:
























Thus, the current government optimally stabilizes prices (πNt = 0) which implies that υt = 0.
Further, it follows from (A.19), that this policy generates a recession, ωt = −κµt/uT (t) ≤ 0.
For γ < 1, set µt = max
{



















where ∆̄t = ∆o,t −min
{




> 0. Thus, the current government do not find
optimal to stabilize prices, πNt < 0, which also implies that υt > 0 and µt ≥ 0. This policy
generates smaller boom than under a price stability policy by equation (A.19).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof proceeds by first showing that any allocation {cTt , `t, bt+1, pNt , πNt } that satisfy (16)-
(18) and (21) also satisfy the general equilibrium, and then describing the optimal monetary
policy and optimal tax rate.











By definition, this makes (25) hold also. The government’s optimisation problem then reduces
to



























ϕπN(1 + πN) + (ε− 1)ω − ϕ`−1Es′|sΛ [L(b′, s′)M(b′, s′)] = 0
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Again ι ≥ 0, λ∗ ≥ 0 are the multiplier on the resource constraint for the nontradable good and
the tradable good respectively, µ∗ ≥ 0 is the multiplier on the credit constraint, ξ ≥ 0 is the
multiplier the nontradable good pricing implementability constraint. The optimality conditions
of the government’s problem, when capital flow taxes are available, are given by:
cTt :: λ
∗


























+ (1− γ−1)κpNt yNt µ∗t = ξt
(
γ−1pNt ψp,t − `tψ`,t
)
(A.24)






Combining (A.24) with (A.25) and rearranging the expression yields
ϕ∆tuN(t)π
N
t = uN(t)ωt + (1− γ−1)κpNt µ∗t (A.26)
This complete the proof that when taxes are available and used optimally, the path for the
inflation rate when the government cannot commit to future policies satisfies (A.26) as in





























t . The proof for the optimal tax rate then consists in showing that
households’ Euler equation for bond holds. Combining (A.22) and (A.24) yields:










Substituting the expression of λ∗t into (A.23) and using γ
−1pNt ψp,t = c
N
t ψN,t, it follows that
households’ Euler equation for bond holds: uT (t) = βRt(1 + τ
b
t )EtuT (t+ 1).
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B Numerical Solution Method (Algorithm)
B.1 For Competitive Equilibrium under a Price Stability Policy
This algorithm is build on Bianchi (2011)’s algorithm that incorporates the occasionally binding
endogenous constraint, modified to account for the nominal rigidities. Formally, the computa-
tion of the competitive equilibrium operates directly on the first-order conditions and requires
solving for functions {B(b, s),L(b, s), CT (b, s),PN(b, s), µ(b, s)} such that:
CT (b, s) + B(b, s)
R










APN(b, s)L(b, s) + yT
)
(B.3)
uT (c(b, s)− g (L(b, s)))
= βREs′|s {uT (c(B(b, s), s′)− g (L(B(b, s), s)))}+ µ(b, s) (B.4)
uN (c(b, s)− g (L(b, s))) +
1
A
u` (c(b, s)− g (L(b, s))) = −κPN(b, s)µ(b, s) (B.5)
where c(b, s) ≡ c
(
CT (b, s), AL(b, s)
)
. The steps for the algorithm are the following:
1. Generate discrete grids Gb = {b1, b2, ..., bM} for the bond position and Gs = {s1, s2, ..., sN}
for the shock state space, and choose an interpolation scheme for evaluating the functions
outside the grid of bonds. The piecewise linear approximation is used to interpolate the
functions and the grid for bonds contains 200 points.
2. Conjecture Bh(b, s), Lh(b, s), CTh (b, s), PNh (b, s), µh(b, s) at time H, ∀b ∈ Gb and ∀s ∈ Gs.
3. Set i = 1
4. Solve for the values of Bh−i(b, s), Lh−i(b, s), CTh−i(b, s), PNh−i(b, s), µh−i(b, s) at time h− i
using (B.1)-(B.5) and Bh−i+1(b, s), Lh−i+1(b, s), CTh−i+1(b, s), ∀b ∈ Gb and ∀s ∈ Gs:
(a) First, assume that the credit constraint (B.3) is not binding. Set µh−i(b, s) = 0 and
using (B.4), (B.5) and a root finding algorithm solve for CTh−i(b, s) and Lh−i(b, s).
Solve for Bh−i(b, s) and PNh−i(b, s) using (B.1) and (B.2).




APNh−i(b, s)Lh−i(b, s) + yT
)
holds. If the credit con-
straint is satisfied, move to the next grid point.
(c) Otherwise, using (B.1), (B.3), (B.4), (B.5) and a root finding algorithm solve for
µh−i(b, s), Bh−i(b, s), CTh−i(b, s) and Lh−i(b, s) and using (B.2) solve for PNh−i(b, s).
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5. Convergence. The competitive equilibrium is found if
∥∥supB,s xh−i(b, s)− xh−i+1(b, s) < ε∥∥
for x ∈ {B, ,L, CT}. Otherwise, set xh−i(b, s) = xh−i+1(b, s), i ≈ i+ 1 and go to step 4.
B.2 For Optimal Time-Consistent Monetary Policy
The solution method proposed here uses a nested fixed point algorithm to solve for optimal time-
consistent monetary policy and is related to the literature using Markov perfect equilibria (e.g.
Kein et al. (2008) and Bianchi and Mendoza (forthcoming)). In the inner loop, using the Bell-
man equation and value function iteration, solve for value function and policy functions taking
as given future policies. Formally, given functions {CT (b, s),PN(b, s),B(b, s),L(b, s),M(b, s)},
the Bellman equation is given by:
V(b, s) = max
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− ϕ`−1Es′|sΛ [L(b′, s′)M(b′, s′)] = 0 (B.12)
Given the solution to the Bellman equation, update future policies as the outer loop. The steps
for the algorithm are the following:
1. Generate discrete grids Gb = {b1, b2, ..., bM} for the bond position and Gs = {s1, s2, ..., sN}
for the shock state space, and choose an interpolation scheme for evaluating the functions
outside the grid of bonds. The piecewise linear approximation is used to interpolate the
functions and the grid for bonds contains 200 points.
2. Guess policy functions B, CT , PN , M at time H, ∀b ∈ Gb and ∀s ∈ Gs.
3. For given L, CT , PN ,M solve the recursive problem using value function iteration to find
the value function and policy functions:
(a) First, assume that the credit constraint (B.9) is not binding. Set µ = 0 – (B.11)
is thus satisfied – and solve the optimization problem (B.6) subject to (B.7), (B.8),
(B.10), (B.12) using a Newton type algorithm and check whether (B.9) holds.
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(b) Second, assume that the credit constraint (B.9) is binding – (B.11) is thus satisfied.
Solve the optimization problem (B.6) subject to (B.7)-(B.10), (B.12) using a Newton
type algorithm.
(c) Compare the solutions in (a) and (b).The optimal choices in each state is the best
solution. Denote {νi}i, with i ∈ {b′, `, cT , pN , πN}, the associated policy functions.
4. Evaluate convergence. Compute the sup distance between B, CT , PN , M and {νi}, with
i ∈ {b′, cT , pN , πN}. If the sup distance is not smaller enough (higher than ε = 1e − 7),
update B, CT , PN , M and solve again the recursive problem.
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